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Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent
preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this
assumption into question, behavioural ﬁndings cause fundamental problems for
normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations
from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the
preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly.
We argue that this preference puriﬁcation approach implicitly uses a dualistic
model of the human being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an
outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically
problematic.
Keywords: preference puriﬁcation; inner rational agent; behavioural welfare
economics; libertarian paternalism; context-dependent preferences
In neoclassical economics, it is standard practice to assume that individuals have
stable and context-independent preferences over all economically relevant outcomes,
and to use the satisfaction of those preferences as the primary normative criterion.
By calling this assumption into question, the ﬁndings of behavioural economics are
causing fundamental problems for normative economics. In this paper, we critically
evaluate a response to these problems that has been advocated by many prominent
behavioural economists and that has recently been endorsed by Hausman (2012) in a
philosophical enquiry into how the concepts of preference, value, choice and welfare
are (and ought to be) used in economics. Following Hausman (p. 102), we will call
this approach ‘preference puriﬁcation’. The essential idea is that when an individual’s
decisions are inconsistent with defensible assumptions about rational choice, those
decisions can be treated as mistakes. The task for welfare economics is then to
reconstruct the preferences that the individual would have acted on, had her reason-
ing not been distorted by whatever psychological mechanisms were responsible for
the mistakes, and to use the satisfaction of these reconstructed preferences as a
normative criterion.
We will argue that this approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human
being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped inside a psychological shell. The
inner agent is pictured as the locus of the identity of the human being and as the source
of normative authority about its interests and goals. There is no attempt to represent the
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psychology of this agent; its rationality is simply taken as given. The psychological
mechanisms that induce deviations from supposedly rational choice are treated as
properties of the outer shell that can prevent the inner agent from achieving its objec-
tives. Whether viewed in the perspective of psychology or of philosophy, this model is
problematic.
We will begin by describing some of the context-dependent features of real
decision-making behaviour that cause problems for conventional welfare economics
(Section 1). We will explain the preference puriﬁcation approach that behavioural
welfare economists have used to try to resolve these problems (Section 2) and consider
Hausman’s endorsement of this approach (Section 3). Drawing on Hausman and
Welch’s (2010) attempt to deﬁne a concept of autonomy that is appropriate for beha-
vioural agents, we will explain the sense in which the preference puriﬁcation approach
presupposes the model of the inner rational agent (Section 4). We will argue that the
idea that context-dependent choices are caused by errors of reasoning is fundamentally
misconceived (Section 5). Finally, we will offer a conjecture about why behavioural
economists have been attracted by the model of the inner rational agent (Section 6).
1. Background
Our main focus will be on a class of cases that feature prominently in discussions
about the normative signiﬁcance of behavioural ﬁndings. These are cases in which a
person’s preferences, choices or judgements are strongly affected by factors that work
through well-understood psychological mechanisms but seem to have little or no rele-
vance to that person’s well-being, interests or goals. Although there is a clear sense in
which the choices made (or preferences revealed or judgements expressed) by the per-
son in different contexts are inconsistent with one another, it is not at all obvious which
(if any) of these choices is correct – or even how ‘correctness’ should be deﬁned.
Here is a typical example. In an experiment reported by Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler (1990, pp. 1338–1339), student subjects reported their valuations for coffee
mugs. Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental treatments. In one treatment,
each subject was asked to consider each of a range of amounts of money, and to say
whether she would choose to have a mug or the money. In another treatment, each sub-
ject was ﬁrst given the mug, free of charge, and then asked whether she would choose
to sell it back to the experimenters at each of a range of prices (the same range of
money amounts as in the ﬁrst treatment). Notice that, deﬁned in terms of what a subject
can take away from the experiment, the problems faced by the two sets of subjects are
exactly the same: the only difference is whether the problems are framed as choosing
between the mug and money or as selling the mug. However, the median valuation of
the mug in the selling treatment ($7.12) was more than double that in the choosing
treatment ($3.12). This effect can be explained by the hypothesis that losses have
greater psychological salience than equal and opposite gains. (In the choosing treat-
ment, subjects are thinking about gaining the mug, while in the selling treatment, they
are thinking about losing it.) It would be very difﬁcult to argue that the difference
between being told that you have been given a coffee mug and being told that you can
choose to be given one is a good reason for a twofold difference in your valuation of
the mug, and in this sense, the effect seems irrational; but that does not answer the
question of whether $7.12 is an irrationally high valuation or whether $3.12 is an
irrationally low one.






























Here is another example. Read and van Leeuwen (1998) report a ﬁeld experiment
in which workers made choices between free snacks which would be delivered at a
designated time a week later. The menu from which subjects could choose contained
healthy options (e.g. apples) and unhealthy ones (e.g. Mars bars). There were four treat-
ments, deﬁned by two different times of day – ‘after lunch time’ and ‘in the late after-
noon’ – at which the choice was made and (independently) at which the snack would
be delivered. The background assumption was that most workers would be hungrier at
the later time. Read and van Leeuwen found that, holding constant the time of delivery,
subjects were more likely to choose unhealthy snacks if they made the choice in the
late afternoon. In broad terms, the psychological mechanism behind this result is easy
to understand. The hungrier you feel, the more attention you give to cues that are
directed towards the satisfaction of hunger, and the more vividly you can imagine
experiencing feelings of hunger in other situations. Thus, the hunger-satisfying proper-
ties of the Mars bars are perceived more vividly in the late afternoon, irrespective of
when it will actually be eaten. Given the familiarity of the snack options and the pre-
dictability of daily ﬂuctuations in hunger and satiation, it would be implausible to claim
that differences in the time of day at which the decision is made provide good reasons
for different choices about what to eat at a given time seven days later. In this sense,
the context-dependent preferences revealed in the experiment seem irrational. But that
does not answer the question of whether, in any given situation, it is more rational to
choose an apple or a Mars bar.
Our third example concerns a less obvious principle of consistency. It is the version
of the Allais Paradox discussed by Savage (1954, pp. 101–103). Respondents are asked
to imagine two different situations, in each of which there is a choice between two
gambles. In Situation 1, the choice is between Gamble 1, which gives $500,000 with
probability 1, and Gamble 2, which gives $2,500,000 with probability .1, $500,000
with probability .89 and nothing with probability .01. In Situation 2, the choice is
between Gamble 3, which gives $500,000 with probability .11 and nothing with proba-
bility .89 and Gamble 4, which gives $2,500,000 with probability .1 and nothing with
probability .9. Many people report strict preferences for Gamble 1 in Situation 1 and
for Gamble 4 in Situation 2. According to the axioms of expected utility theory, a per-
son with consistent preferences would either prefer Gambles 1 and 3 or prefer Gambles
2 and 4. But the theory does not say which of those two patterns of preference is more
rational.
In this paper, we will focus on cases, like those we have just discussed, in which
choices or preferences are allegedly inconsistent. However, it is important to keep in
mind that judgements can also be systematically context dependent in ways which do
not seem to be supported by defensible reasons, and that the question of which of the
mutually inconsistent judgements is correct can be no easier to answer than analogous
questions about choices or preferences. For example, people’s judgements about their
own happiness are subject to ‘focusing illusions’ that seem to result from mechanisms
similar to those involved in the choice between future snacks in Read and van Leeu-
wen’s experiment. When people are trying to judge their overall satisfaction with their
lives, the implicit weights they give to different aspects of life can depend on what is
currently the focus of their attention (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998) – an effect summed
up in Kahneman’s (2011, p. 402) maxim: ‘Nothing in life is an important as you think
it is when you are thinking about it’. Since most of the happiness data that economists
and psychologists use are generated from self-reported judgements, one should not






























assume that the problem of context-dependent preferences can be resolved simply by
deﬁning ‘true preferences’ in terms of happiness.
We recognise that there are some cases of context-dependent choice for which the
deﬁnition of a person’s true preferences or best interests is fairly uncontroversial. For
example, in some retail energy markets, competing suppliers offer exactly the same
product, priced according to different tariffs. It seems unexceptionable to assume that,
for any given quantity bought, consumers have an underlying preference for paying less
rather than more. In fact, when tariffs are complex, consumers often fail to buy from
the supplier offering the lowest ﬁnal price (Wilson & Price, 2010). Representing such
choices as mistakes, deﬁned relative to ‘true’ preferences for low prices, may be a rea-
sonable modelling strategy. In this case, however, the assumption that is taken to be
uncontroversial in deﬁning mistakes equates the consumer’s subjective ranking of
options (alternative tariffs) with an objective ranking (in inverse order of their prices)
that is independent of the consumer’s perceptions or judgements. There is no obvious
analogue to this objective ranking in cases such as the choice between buying and not
buying a coffee mug, or between eating an apple and eating a Mars bar.
The distinction between objective and subjective rankings is important because of
the way in which the idea of mistakes is used in behavioural welfare economics. A
recurring theme in this literature is that the ﬁndings of behavioural economics justify
policies which ‘nudge’ individuals towards those choices that are in their best interests
(e.g. Camerer et al., 2003; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003 [henceforth ‘ST’]; Thaler &
Sunstein, 2008 [henceforth ‘TS’]). The element of paternalism in these proposals can
be made more palatable by suggesting not only that their aim is to increase the welfare
of the targeted individuals, but also that welfare is being measured according to those
individuals’ own judgements, and that the choices that individuals are being nudged
away from would be mistakes. These suggestions are often expressed through the idea
that nudges help individuals to make what, on reﬂection, they themselves would recog-
nise as better choices. For example, asking the reader to consider a problem of choos-
ing between a large number of prescription drug plans, Thaler and Sunstein (2008,
p. 10) say: ‘[Y]ou might beneﬁt from a little help. So long as people are not choosing
perfectly, some changes in the choice architecture could make their lives go better (as
judged by their own preferences …)’.1 Contrast this notion of helping people to avoid
mistakes with the more overt paternalism of a parent who limits a two-year-old child’s
consumption of chocolate in the interests of a balanced diet. The parent believes her
action promotes the child’s welfare, but the child’s wish to eat chocolate is not a
mistake. As a real desire for an experience that really is pleasurable, it makes good
sense in terms of all the reasons that the child is capable of understanding. If context-
dependent choices can be represented as mistakes, the relationship between a paternalis-
tic policy-maker and a targeted individual looks less like that between a benevolent
guardian and an incompetent ward.
To avoid misunderstanding, however, we must make clear that this paper is not pri-
marily concerned with whether (or how far) public policy should be paternalistic. It is
possible to investigate questions about individual welfare without presupposing that
governments ought to adopt whatever policies can be shown to maximise well-being.
Although many advocates of preference puriﬁcation present it as a technique that can
be used in designing paternalistic policies, this linkage is not universal. In particular,
Hausman (2012) endorses preference puriﬁcation as a tool for the measurement of wel-
fare in applied economics, but has serious reservations about the use of nudges as a
policy tool. By bracketing out the question of what governments ought to do with






























welfare measurements, we are able to evaluate Hausman’s philosophical arguments for
preference puriﬁcation.
We also bracket out questions about the use of nudges for non-paternalistic purposes.
A signiﬁcant part of the nudge literature is directed at using behavioural insights to
induce ‘behaviour change’ in situations in which the targeted individuals do not seem to
be making mistakes in satisfying their own preferences or in promoting their own wel-
fare: they are simply frustrating the achievement of some public policy objective. For
example, TS’s catalogue of emulation-worthy policies includes nudges designed to
reduce littering, to increase registration in organ donation programmes and (through
naming and shaming polluting ﬁrms) to reduce the release of potentially hazardous
chemicals into the environment (pp. 60, 175–182, 190–191). The UK Behavioural
Insights Team prides itself on having designed nudges which make people more likely
to pay their tax bills on time, to the beneﬁt of the public ﬁnances (Halpern & Nesterak,
2014). Discussion of the legitimacy of such policies has focused on issues of trans-
parency and democratic accountability (Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; Sunstein, 2014). In
contrast, our concern is with the deﬁnition and measurement of welfare.
2. Behavioural welfare economics and preference puriﬁcation
Since Sunstein and Thaler have been particularly inﬂuential in the development of
behavioural welfare economics, we begin by looking at the role of preference puriﬁca-
tion in their arguments. Their original paper (ST) sets out a manifesto for libertarian
paternalism.2 Their later book Nudge (TS) extends and popularises the ideas in ST.
One of Sunstein and Thaler’s key claims is that the ﬁndings of behavioural
economics make paternalism unavoidable: the anti-paternalist position is ‘incoherent’, a
‘nonstarter’. In both works, this claim is developed in relation to a now-familiar cafeteria
example. The premise is that customers’ choices between alternative food items are
inﬂuenced by the prominence with which those items are displayed on the cafeteria
counter. Knowing that some items are healthier than others, the cafeteria director has to
choose the relative prominence with which different items are displayed. ST consider
two apparently reasonable strategies that the director might adopt: she could ‘make the
choices that she thinks would make the customers best off, all things considered’ or she
could ‘give consumers what she thinks they would choose on their own’. We are told
that the second option is ‘what anti-paternalists would favor’, but that the anti-paternalist
argument for this option is incoherent. By assumption, the customers
lack well-formed preferences, in the sense of preferences that are ﬁrmly held and preexist
the director’s own choices about how to order the relevant items [along the counter]. If the
arrangement of the alternatives has a signiﬁcant effect on the selections of the customers
make, then their true ‘preferences’ do not formally exist.3
Sunstein and Thaler conclude that the ﬁrst strategy, despite being paternalistic, is the
only reasonable option for a well-intentioned director (ST, pp. 1164–1165, 1182; see
also TS, pp. 1–3).
Notice that, as in the general class of problems described in Section 1, the choices of
the cafeteria customers are context dependent in a way that has a psychological explana-
tion (more prominently displayed items are more likely to engage attention) but does not
seem relevant to customers’ interests or goals. Such cases are central to Sunstein and
Thaler’s argumentative strategy. The key innovation of libertarian paternalism is the idea
that individuals’ choices from given sets of (objectively deﬁned) options can be






























inﬂuenced by interventions which affect only the (subjectively perceived) framing of the
decision problem. Such nudges can work only in cases in which choices are context
dependent.
Notice also that the cafeteria problem is presented as a problem for the cafeteria
director. The director is understood as someone who acts on her own authority and
responsibility, but with the objective of beneﬁting her customers. Sunstein and Thaler
describe this role as that of a ‘planner’ (in ST) or ‘choice architect’ (in TS). The idea
that normative recommendations are addressed to a benevolent planner is a common
device in welfare economics, and leads naturally to the further idea that those recom-
mendations should be directed at increasing the well-being of the individuals for whom
the planner is planning. In TS, this idea is given a slightly different twist: Sunstein and
Thaler say that their recommendations are designed to ‘make choosers better off, as
judged by themselves’ (TS, p. 5; italics in original). The italicised clause recurs with
minor variations throughout TS (e.g. pp. 10, 12, 80). The implication, we take it, is that
although the planner acts on her own responsibility, she tries to respect each individ-
ual’s subjective judgements about what makes him better off.
Sunstein and Thaler’s approach to normative economics requires that the planner
can reconstruct each individual’s judgements about his own well-being, even though
these judgements are not always revealed in his choices. But how, at the conceptual
level, are we to understand these judgements? And how is the planner to reconstruct
them? The closest that Sunstein and Thaler come to addressing these questions
systematically is in their discussion of decision-making errors.
Immediately after presenting the principle of trying to make choosers ‘better off, as
judged by themselves’, TS undertake to show that
in many cases, individuals make pretty bad decisions – decisions that they would not have
made if they had paid full attention and possessed complete information, unlimited cogni-
tive abilities, and complete self-control. (TS, p. 5)
The corresponding passage in ST uses almost the same characterisation of decisions
that would not have been made if individuals had been fully rational, and refers to
these as ‘inferior decisions in terms of their [i.e. the individuals’] own welfare’ (ST,
p. 1162). The implication is that, for Sunstein and Thaler, the criterion of individual
well-being is given by the preferences that the relevant individual would have revealed,
had his decision-making not been affected by reasoning imperfections – that is,
limitations of attention, information, cognitive ability or self-control. So, the task for
the planner is to try to reconstruct individuals’ underlying or latent preferences by
simulating what they would have chosen, had they not been subject to reasoning
imperfections.4 This is preference puriﬁcation.
Notice that preference puriﬁcation cannot provide the welfare criterion that Sunstein
and Thaler need unless latent preferences are context independent. The context depen-
dence of revealed preferences, with the supposed implication that paternalism is
unavoidable, provides the starting point for Sunstein and Thaler’s argument for libertar-
ian paternalism. But, if the choice architect’s decision criterion turned out to be context
dependent too, that argument would be fatally undermined. The assumption that latent
preferences are context independent is implicit in Sunstein and Thaler’s arguments, but
is never defended. One of their favourite rhetorical strategies is to characterise their
opponents as maintaining that human beings are not subject to reasoning imperfections
– that human beings can ‘think like Albert Einstein, store as much memory as IBM’s
Big Blue, and exercise the willpower of Mahatma Gandhi’. The reader is invited to






























agree with the hardly controversial proposition that ‘the folks we know are not like
that’, and encouraged to infer that this must be why ordinary folks’ choices have the
apparently irrational patterns that behavioural economics and psychologists have dis-
covered (TS, pp. 6–8). But this inference is not as obviously valid as it may seem. We
will return to this issue later, but to lay a foundation for later arguments, we invite the
reader to think about the following question. Imagine a being – let us call him
SuperReasoner – who has the intelligence of Einstein, the memory of Big Blue and the
self-control of Gandhi. Imagine in addition (since this is also a part of Sunstein and
Thaler’s characterisation of perfect reasoning) that SuperReasoner’s capacious memory
contains every item of information that can be extracted from any existing publication
or database. Otherwise, however, SuperReasoner is just like some ordinary human,
whom we will call Joe. If Joe were in Sunstein and Thaler’s cafeteria, his choices
between food items would be inﬂuenced by the prominence of their displays. Now,
imagine taking SuperReasoner into the cafeteria. Would the probability of his choosing
cream cake be independent of the position of cream cake on the counter?
Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 2009) propose an approach to behavioural welfare
economics that is similar to preference puriﬁcation. Presuming it to be self-evident that
welfare economics is addressed to ‘the planner’, they characterise ‘standard welfare
economics’ as ‘instruct[ing] the planner to respect the choices an individual would
make for himself’ (2007, p. 464). Their objective is to extend this form of welfare
economics to cases in which choices are context dependent. The key concept in their
theoretical framework is a generalised choice situation (GCS) for a given individual,
consisting of a set of ‘objects’ from which the individual must choose one and a set of
‘ancillary conditions’. Ancillary conditions are properties of the choice environment
that may affect behaviour, but which the planner treats as normatively irrelevant.
(Applying this conceptual scheme to the cafeteria, food items are objects, while ways
of displaying them are ancillary conditions.) The individual’s choice behaviour is repre-
sented by a correspondence which, for each GCS, picks out the subset of objects that
the individual is willing to choose. Bernheim and Rangel’s ﬁrst line of approach is to
propose a criterion that respects the individual’s revealed preferences over pairs of
objects if those preferences are not affected by changes in ancillary conditions, and
instructs the planner ‘to live with whatever ambiguity remains’ (2009, p. 53). They
then suggest that this rather unhelpful criterion might be given more bite by the dele-
tion of ‘suspect’ GCSs. A GCS is deemed to be suspect if its ancillary conditions
induce impairments in the individual’s ability to attend to or process information or to
implement desired courses of action. In effect, this approach puriﬁes choice data by
eliminating any choices that were made when the individual’s reasoning was impaired.
Considering only the puriﬁed data, it then uses the satisfaction of context-independent
revealed preferences as the normative criterion. Notice that this approach yields welfare
rankings only for those pairs of objects for which revealed preferences, after
puriﬁcation, are context independent.
A different way of using the idea of puriﬁcation is to begin by assuming the exis-
tence of context-independent latent preferences, and to propose some speciﬁc model of
the psychological processes that intervene between those preferences and actual
choices. Given such a model, one can then investigate how far and under what assump-
tions latent preferences can be reconstructed from observations of choices. Salant and
Rubinstein (2008) follow this approach within a general theoretical framework similar
to Bernheim and Rangel’s. They deﬁne an extended choice problem for an individual
as a pair (A, f) where A is a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternative objects






























of choice, and f is a ‘frame’. The individual’s decisions are determined by the interac-
tion of her frame-independent ‘underlying preferences’ with decision-making heuristics
that are activated by, and conditional on, the frame (p. 1288). Like Sunstein and Thaler,
they imagine a ‘social planner’ who chooses the frame with the aim that the individ-
ual’s choice should be consistent with her underlying preferences (p. 1294).
This approach is often used to derive normative implications from behavioural
models. The model of ‘salience and consumer choice’ presented by Bordalo, Gennaioli,
and Shleifer (2013, henceforth ‘BGS’, is a good example. The psychological intuition
behind this model is that choice options (‘goods’) can be described as bundles of
characteristics, and that when a consumer evaluates a good, she gives most attention,
other things being equal, to those attributes of that good that are perceived as most
‘salient’ (that is, as having values that are most different, positively or negatively, from
the average values of all the goods in the choice set). BGS assume that a ‘rational’
consumer would maximise a linear utility function in which each attribute has a con-
stant utility weight; by implication, these weights represent the consumer’s true subjec-
tive valuations of the attributes. A non-rational consumer maximises a function in
which the attribute weights are ‘distorted’ by salience, and so may ‘undervalue’ or
‘overvalue’ a good, depending on how its attributes compare with the corresponding
averages. In our terminology, BGS are treating the rational utility function as represent-
ing the latent preferences of the non-rational consumer. The properties of the model
ensure that, given sufﬁcient observations of the choices of a non-rational consumer, her
latent preferences can be recovered.
This methodology is developed with a more applied emphasis by Bleichrodt,
Pinto-Prades, and Wakker (2001, henceforth ‘BPW’ and Li, Li, and Wakker (2014). These
authors are primarily concerned with cases in which a professional specialist has to make
a decision in the best interests of a client. For example, consider a physician who has to
choose between alternative medical treatments for an unconscious patient. The physician
has access to data from a stated preference survey in which the patient made various
hypothetical choices between alternative probability distributions over health states. How-
ever, these responses are not fully consistent with one another, given the background
assumption that ‘the right normative model for decision under uncertainty’ is expected
utility theory – an assumption to which BPW are committed. According to BPW, such
inconsistencies in stated preference responses ‘designate deﬁciencies in our measurement
instruments that, even if the best currently available, do not tap perfectly into the clients’
values’. The problems resulting from inconsistencies in stated preferences can be miti-
gated if those preferences are elicited in face-to-face interviews, in which the client is
asked to reconsider inconsistent choices (pp. 1498–1500, 1510). Notice the implicit
assumption that the client has (or can be guided to form) preferences that are consistent
with one another and with expected utility theory; the use of interviews is presented as a
method of purifying preferences by the elimination of error.
But what if the physician has to do with the patient’s inconsistent survey responses?
The real novelty of BPW’s approach is their proposal of ‘a quantitative manner for
correcting biases in decision under risk and uncertainty when these cannot be avoided’
(p. 1499). BPW use cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) as the
descriptive model of choice while retaining expected utility theory as the normative
model. There are two main differences between these models. First, cumulative pro-
spect theory uses a probability weighting function to transform objective probabilities
into their subjective counterparts; this transformation can be interpreted as taking
account of psychological biases in the processing of probability information. Second, it






























has a loss aversion parameter which can be interpreted as picking up a bias induced by
the framing of decision problems. Given these interpretations, an expected utility model
of preferences can be constructed from an empirically estimated prospect theory model
by replacing the estimated probability weighting and loss aversion parameters with the
‘unbiased’ values implied by expected utility theory. BPW propose that the patient’s
stated preferences should be used to estimate a prospect theory model, and that the
‘corrected’ expected utility model should be used to make choices on behalf of the
patient. This is an econometric form of preference puriﬁcation.
A somewhat similar methodology is proposed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2007, 2008),
who frame the problem as that of making inferences about individuals’ preferences
from observations of their choices while recognising that the reasoning that led to these
choice may have involved mistakes. Their main examples are of choice under uncer-
tainty. Their approach is to infer an individual’s subjective beliefs from the choices he
makes between gambles with money outcomes, on the assumption that he prefers more
money to less (contingent on any given state) and prefers higher probabilities of pre-
ferred outcomes to lower probabilities. If subjective beliefs, elicited in this way, do not
coincide with objective relative frequencies, a ‘revealed mistake in beliefs’ is deemed
to have occurred. The individual’s preferences are then puriﬁed by working out what
he would have chosen, had he acted on correct beliefs.
The work we have reviewed in this Section can be understood as belonging to a
common programme for reconciling normative economics with behavioural ﬁndings.
This programme of behavioural welfare economics takes the objective of normative
economics to be the measurement of the effects of economic policies on individual
well-being, as assessed from the viewpoint of a social planner or entrusted professional
(such as a physician, dietician or ‘choice architect’) who wishes to respect individuals’
judgements about their own well-being. It treats cases in which an individual’s choices
depend on ‘irrelevant’ properties of framing as errors, ‘error’ being deﬁned relative to
the latent preferences that the individual would have revealed if not subject to reason-
ing imperfections. Latent preferences are assumed to satisfy conventional principles of
rational consistency – in particular, context independence. The satisfaction of latent
preferences is taken as the normative criterion.
Implicit in this programme, as we understand it, is the idea that latent preference is
a subjective concept. By this we mean that latent preferences are judgements or percep-
tions that are formed within the minds of individual human beings; they do not corre-
spond directly with objective properties of the external world. Sunstein and Thaler
appeal to this notion of subjectivity when they repeatedly insist that their aim is to
make people better off as judged by themselves. Quite apart from issues of rhetorical
strategy, there is a fundamental reason for thinking that the preference puriﬁcation
approach presupposes a subjective interpretation of latent preferences. Consider the
implications of the contrary position, that behavioural welfare economics uses a crite-
rion of (supposedly) objective well-being. What then would be the point of taking the
circuitous route of reformulating that criterion as the satisfaction of latent preferences,
deﬁning a person’s latent preferences in terms of the hypothetical choices that he would
make in the absence of reasoning imperfections, and then postulating that such choices
would maximise objective well-being? But if well-being is a subjective concept, prefer-
ence puriﬁcation can be defended as a way of correcting errors in an individual’s
reasoning while respecting his judgements about his own well-being.
If the puriﬁcation approach is to work, latent preferences must be coherent. But if
latent preference is a subjective concept, the coherence properties that are attributed to






























them cannot be explained by the hypothesis that latent preferences map some objective
concept that already has those properties. So the preference puriﬁcation approach, as
applied to any given individual, must presuppose that the individual has potential
access to some mode of latent reasoning that generates subjective preferences that
satisfy conventional principles of rational consistency. However, the writers we have
considered so far do not explain what that mode of reasoning is or how it generates
coherent preferences. All they tell us is that it is free of the ‘imperfections’ that beha-
vioural economists and cognitive psychologists have identiﬁed in actual human reason-
ing. This limitation of the preference puriﬁcation approach perhaps stems from the
structure of the standard theory of rational choice. That theory is formulated in terms
of axioms of consistency among preferences and between preferences and choices; it
does not try to explain the reasoning by which individuals construct their preferences.
In an analysis which uses this conceptual framework, latent reasoning is a black box.
One of the interesting features of Hausman’s defence of preference puriﬁcation is that
it looks inside this box.
3. Hausman on preference puriﬁcation
Hausman (2012) discusses preference puriﬁcation as part of a larger analysis of the
economic concepts of preference and welfare. He says that this analysis ‘clariﬁes and
for the most part defends’ the everyday practice of economics, while challenging some
of the ideas that economists use when philosophising about their work (p. i).
Hausman begins by trying to ﬁnd a coherent interpretation of the concept of
preference, as that is standardly used in positive economics. He proposes the following
deﬁnition: ‘To say that Jill prefers x to y is to say that when Jill has thought about every-
thing she takes to bear on how much she values x and y, Jill ranks x above y’ (p. 34).
Thus, a preference is comparative (x is ranked above y); the comparison is in terms of
value; the valuation is subjective (‘how much she values …’); and it takes account of the
totality of factors that the individual thinks relevant to the comparison (‘everything she
takes to bear on …’). In short, a preference is a ‘total subjective comparative evaluation’.
Hausman claims that this deﬁnition ‘matches most of current practice’ in economics, and
urges economists to reserve the word ‘preference’ for this usage (pp. 34–35).
That the economic concept of preference is comparative and subjective seems
uncontroversial. That it is also total is implicit in a fundamental feature of the role of
preferences in economics – that preferences determine choices. (A person’s choices can
be inﬂuenced by any factor that she takes to be relevant. So, if preferences determine
choices, preferences must take account of any such factors too.) But Hausman’s claim
that preferences are evaluations is tied in with his reason-based understanding of
choice. Since this claim turns out to be important for Hausman’s defence of preference
puriﬁcation, we need to explain what he means by it.
Hausman interprets preferences as products of reasoning and as premises that can
be used in further reasoning about what to choose. It is, he says, a misconception to
think that preferences are ‘arbitrary matters of taste, not subject to rational considera-
tion’ (p. 18); they are ‘more like judgments than feelings’ (p. 135). He interprets the
economic theory of choice as a theory of rational deliberation, in which individuals try
to answer the question ‘What do I have most reason to do?’ (p. 5). He maintains that,
in using a theory of rational choice, economics is committed to the claim that its
explanations of an individual’s choices are expressed in terms of reasons that justify
those choices. Thus






























[E]conomists regard ordinal utility theory as both a fragment of a positive theory that
explains and predicts choices and as a fragment of a theory of rational choice that speciﬁes
conditions that preferences must satisfy in order to justify choices. (p. 20)
In arguing that this interpretation of ‘preference’ is faithful to the practice of eco-
nomics, Hausman (pp. 19–20) considers how the axioms of choice theory might be
justiﬁed as properties of sound reasoning about choice. He agrees with Broome (1991)
that the logic of total comparative evaluation requires transitivity. (If, all things consid-
ered, x is more valuable than y and y is more valuable than z, then necessarily, x is
more valuable than z.) While not claiming that the completeness axiom is logically
required in the same way, Hausman points out that if an individual’s choices are always
(i.e. given any feasible set) to be determined by preferences, preferences must be com-
plete. Thus, completeness is ‘a boundary condition on rational choice’. The implicit
axiom that preferences are context independent excludes ‘factors that ought to be irrele-
vant’ for total comparative evaluations. Thus, if a rational choice is one that is justiﬁed
by sound and relevant reasons, and if reasons are to take the form of total comparative
evaluations of the feasible options, rational choice is possible in general only if those
evaluations are complete, transitive and context independent. In this sense, Hausman’s
interpretation of ‘preference’ offers an explanation of why the axioms of choice theory
are treated as principles of rationality.
Having settled on a deﬁnition of ‘preference’, Hausman goes on to consider the role
of preferences in welfare economics. He takes it as self-evident that welfare economics
is concerned with individual well-being, assessed from some neutral viewpoint. He
does not specify explicitly who is the addressee of welfare economics, but his intermit-
tent references to ‘legislators’, ‘policy makers’ and ‘policy analysts’ (e.g. pp. 89, 93,
95–97, 100–101) imply that, in the language of economics, the addressee he has in
mind is a social planner who is seeking to promote well-being. In these respects,
Hausman’s approach to normative economics is aligned with that of behavioural
welfare economics.
One of Hausman’s central claims is that ‘the satisfaction of preferences – even
when preferences are informed, rational, and generally spruced-up – does not constitute
well-being’ (p. 77). Hausman sets out to show that preference satisfaction theories of
well-being – that is, theories that treat preference satisfaction as a (or even the only)
constituent of well-being – are ‘mistaken’ and ‘untenable’ (pp. 86, 88). In line with his
claim to defend the ‘most part’ of the practice of economics, Hausman allows that, in
fact, satisfying preferences usually contribute to well-being. But this is because, in
arriving at total evaluations of the options from which they can choose, individuals are
in most cases strongly inﬂuenced by reasonable beliefs about how each option would
affect their well-being. In such cases, preferences provide reliable information about
well-being, but preference satisfaction still does not constitute well-being.
However, Hausman (pp. 81–83) points to various cases in which, he claims, the
satisfaction of preferences may not promote well-being. One such case is where individ-
uals’ evaluations of options are based on beliefs that are in fact false. Another is where
individuals consciously choose to act contrary to self-interest. For our purposes, the
most relevant case is where ‘preferences are the result of … problematic psychological
mechanisms’. Following the practice of behavioural welfare economics, Hausman treats
these mechanisms as inducing mistakes:
Contemporary psychology has identiﬁed contexts in which people are likely to make mis-
takes, and policy analysts can use these ﬁndings to help decide whether to take people’s






























preferences as guides to their welfare. One advantage of understanding that preferences are
total comparative evaluations is that economists and regulators can make clear sense of
people’s preferences being mistaken. (p. 100, italics in original)
Expanding on this idea in relation to cost–beneﬁt analysis, Hausman says that in
deciding whether to use preferences as indicators of well-being, one should ask whether
the context in which the preferences are revealed is one in which preferences are
‘undistorted’. Having deﬁned the ‘net beneﬁt’ of a policy of the excess of gainers’
willingness to pay over losers’ willingness to accept (p. 93), he says:
The cost-beneﬁt analyst should avoid relying on net beneﬁts when preferences are dis-
torted by decision-making ﬂaws because the ﬂaws provide a good reason to doubt that
such preferences are a good guide to the individual’s welfare. Examples of such ﬂaws
include overconﬁdence, exaggerated optimism, status quo bias, inertia, inattention, myopia,
conformity, akrasia, and addiction. (p. 100)
So what should cost–beneﬁt analysts rely on? Hausman’s answer is that ‘[t]he best
economists can do when they recognize ﬂaws in people’s deliberative capacities is to
minimize their inﬂuence’. More speciﬁcally:
[W]hen preferences are self-interested, well-informed, and undistorted … it is sensible for
those seeking to promote welfare to employ methods of appraising policies such as cost-
beneﬁt analysis that rely on information concerning preference satisfaction. When these
conditions are not met, it makes sense to take steps to purify people’s preferences of mis-
take and distortion so as to widen the domain in which these conditions are met and to
attempt to measure expected beneﬁt rather than preferences. (p. 102).
So Hausman’s proposal for dealing with preference inconsistencies is essentially the
same as that of behavioural welfare economics: preference puriﬁcation.
Recall Hausman’s argument that if preferences are to provide reasons for choice,
they must be complete, transitive and context independent. If a cost–beneﬁt analyst is
to use a person’s puriﬁed preferences as indicators of that person’s well-being in
arriving at policy recommendations, then (at least within the relevant policy domain)
puriﬁed preferences must have those same properties. So, for Hausman’s proposal to
work, each individual’s undistorted reasoning must generate latent preferences that are
complete, transitive and context independent. But can we expect this to be the case?
In Hausman’s analysis of rational preference formation, the agent is represented as
engaging in sound reasoning about the truth or falsity of propositions. A preference is
a particular kind of proposition – a total subjective comparative evaluation – that the
agent holds to be true. This conceptual framework allows a deﬁnition of ‘distorted’ or
‘mistaken’ reasoning as reasoning that contravenes principles of conceptual coherence
or valid inference, broadly understood. Since preference puriﬁcation removes the effects
of such reasoning, it will result in a set of preference propositions that are consistent
with one another and with other propositions to which the agent assents. Since prefer-
ences may be derived from subjective propositions (for example, judgements about
what is desirable or about the constituents of well-being), this account of preference
formation preserves the subjectivity of preferences. As we have explained, Hausman is
able to argue that sets of preference propositions that violate transitivity or context
independence are inconsistent and hence incapable of being generated by sound reason-
ing from consistent premises. But he explicitly denies that sound reasoning necessarily
generates a preference relation that is complete (p. 19); all he can say is that complete-
ness is necessary if choices are to be determined by preferences.






























Thus, Hausman’s analysis does not resolve the problem we identiﬁed in the litera-
ture of behavioural welfare economics. That problem was to justify the implicit
assumption that, for any given individual, there exists some mode of latent reasoning
that generates complete and context-independent subjective preferences. Were there
such a mode of reasoning, it could be argued that context-dependent choices are the
result of reasoning imperfections – that is, of failure to recognise the implications of
sound reasoning. But Hausman’s analysis leaves open the possibility that there are pairs
of options for which sound reasoning is unable to determine a preference ranking. The
implication is that context-dependent choices are not necessarily mistakes that can be
corrected by puriﬁcation.
4. The inner rational agent
As we noted in Section 1, Hausman is less favourably disposed to nudge policies than
are most contributors to behavioural welfare economics. His reservations about nudging,
presented in a jointly authored paper (Hausman & Welch, 2010; henceforth ‘HW’),
throw light on the model of agency that underlies his analysis of preference puriﬁcation.
In their opening summary of libertarian paternalism, HW express agreement with
many of Sunstein and Thaler’s conclusions about welfare. For example, in relation to
TS’s argument for nudging people to save more for retirement, HW say that TS ‘are
impressed by the imperfections in individual decision-making illustrated by the extent
to which people’s choices to save for retirement are inﬂuenced by details concerning
enrolment that ought to be of negligible importance’ and that TS ‘catalogue many
factors that can lead to mistakes in human judgment and decision-making’. For the pur-
poses of their paper, HW do not need to defend TS’s speciﬁc judgements about ‘which
factors interfere with rational deliberation’, but they endorse those judgements as
‘generally plausible’.
HW’s reservations about libertarian paternalism are not about its analysis of
welfare, but about the nudging policies that it recommends. These reservations are
formulated in terms of autonomy, deﬁned as ‘the control an individual has over his or
her evaluations and choices’. If one is concerned about autonomy, HW say, ‘there does
seem to be something paternalistic, not merely beneﬁcent, in designing policies so as
to take advantage of people’s psychological foibles for their own beneﬁt’ (p. 128).
Throughout the paper, nudges are contrasted with ‘rational persuasion’. For example
The reason why nudges such as setting defaults seem … to be paternalist, is that in addi-
tion to or apart from rational persuasion, they may ‘push’ individuals to make one choice
rather than another … [W]hen this ‘pushing’ does not take the form of rational persuasion,
their autonomy – the extent to which they have control over their own evaluations and
deliberations – is diminished. Their actions reﬂect the tactics of the choice architect rather
than exclusively their own evaluation of alternatives. (p. 128)
And (having deﬁned ‘shaping’ as ‘the use of ﬂaws in human decision-making to get
individuals to choose one alternative rather than another’ [p. 128]):
[R]ational persuasion respects both individual liberty and the agent’s control over her own
decision-making, while, in contrast, deception, limiting what choices are available or
shaping choices risks circumventing the individual’s will. (p. 130)
But what do HW mean when they refer to ‘the individual’ or ‘the agent’ as an entity
that may or may not have control over his or her evaluations, deliberations and
choices? Notice that this agent is not a real human being whose thoughts and actions






























are governed by psychological mechanisms. If the choices of the real human being are
inﬂuenced by factors that cannot be construed as good reasons, HW are able to claim
that this agent’s will has been circumvented. The implication seems to be that the agent
is capable of error-free autonomous reasoning that is undistorted by ‘problematic’
human psychological mechanisms. It is open to rational persuasion, but impervious to
attempts to inﬂuence it by other means. Given any decision problem, it can identify the
option that it wishes to choose, referring ‘exclusively’ to its own evaluations of alterna-
tives. This seems to imply that the agent’s reasoning can generate complete, transitive
and context-independent total comparative evaluations. We will call this disembodied
entity the inner rational agent.
Notice how ordinary human psychology is being treated as a set of forces that are
liable to restrict the inner agent’s ability to act according to the implications of its own
reasoning. It is as if the inner rational agent is separated from the world in which it
wants to act by a psychological shell. The human being’s behaviour is determined by
interactions between the autonomous reasoning of the inner agent and the psychological
properties of the outer shell. However, in relation to issues of preference and
judgement, the inner agent is the ultimate normative authority.
Something like this model of human agency seems to be implicit in Hausman’s
account of preference puriﬁcation. Preference puriﬁcation can be thought of as an
attempt to reconstruct the preferences of the inner rational agent by abstracting from
the distorting effects of – by ‘seeing through’ – the psychological shell. We suggest
that behavioural welfare economics rests on a similar model of agency, albeit with a
less fully developed account of the reasoning of the inner rational agent. Recall that
Sunstein and Thaler’s criterion of well-being is given by the preferences that the rele-
vant individual would reveal, were she to pay full attention to decision problems and to
possess complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities and complete self-control.
One might think of these preferences as those of an inner rational agent whose reason-
ing is free of internal errors but which depends on faulty psychological machinery to
provide it with information, to carry out complex information processing operations
and to execute its decisions. Lack of attention can cause faults in the ﬂow of informa-
tion to the inner agent; limited cognitive ability can cause faults in information process-
ing; and lack of self-control can cause faults in decision execution. Preference
puriﬁcation is an attempt to reconstruct the decisions that the inner agent would execute
if the faults in the psychological shell were corrected.
5. Is the model of the inner rational agent tenable?
Let us begin by recording our surprise that so many behavioural economists have
wanted to use the model of the inner rational agent. One of the ﬁrst impulses for what is
now called behavioural economics was a recognition that the mental processes that peo-
ple actually use in decision-making do not necessarily generate choices with the rational-
ity properties traditionally assumed in economics. An obvious corollary of this idea,
pointed out by Kahneman (1996), is that rational choice is not self-explanatory: cases in
which behaviour is consistent with the conventional theory of rational choice are just as
much in need of psychological explanation as are deviations from that theory. The
model of the inner rational agent seems to depend on a denial of this corollary. In that
model, human psychology is represented as a set of forces which affects behaviour by
interfering with rational choice, but rational choice itself – represented by the error-free






























reasoning of the inner agent – is not given any psychological explanation. Kahneman is
right to say that this modelling strategy is ‘deeply problematic’ (pp. 251–252).5
It might be objected that the model of the inner rational agent has psychological
foundations in dual process theories of the mind. The idea that the workings of the
mind can be separated into two ‘systems’ – the fast and automatic System 1 and the
slow and reﬂective System 2 – has been suggested by a number of psychologists (e.g.
Kahneman, 2003; Wason & Evans, 1975) and is the central theme of Kahneman’s
(2011) overview of his contributions to psychology and behavioural economics. Since
Sunstein and Thaler use the same idea as an organising principle when reviewing beha-
vioural ﬁndings (TS, pp. 19–39), it is plausible to conjecture that they are thinking of
the inner rational agent as System 2 and the psychological shell as System 1.
Recently, there has been something of a fashion for economists to appeal to dual
process neurological theories to motivate models of time-inconsistent behaviour. In
these models, individual behaviour is determined by interactions between two neural
systems – one far-sighted, rational and strategically sophisticated, the other either short-
sighted and naïve or automatic. For example, Bernheim and Rangel (2004) explain the
decision-making of drug addicts in terms of interactions between a ‘cold’ mode of rea-
soning, capable of solving dynamic stochastic programming problems, and a ‘hot’
mode of automatic responses to environmental cues. Benhabib and Bisin (2005) use a
similar model of interaction between ‘controlled’ and ‘automatic’ processes to explain
consumption and saving behaviour. Fudenberg and Levine (2006) and Brocas and
Carrillo (2008) present models in which both systems are represented as rational max-
imisers, but one is far-sighted and the other is myopic. This dual process modelling
strategy is perhaps reasonable as a way of representing the decision-making of the type
of drug user who repeatedly tries and fails to quit or of the former drug user who con-
sciously tries to avoid cues that might induce recidivism. One might be more sceptical
when the same strategy is applied to everyday cases of preference inconsistency, as
when Fudenberg and Levine explain the high levels of risk aversion observed in labora-
tory experiments by hypothesising that the typical student subject has deliberately
constrained her own access to cash as a way of solving a self-control problem.
But even if one accepts the dual process theory as a useful way of organising ideas
about human psychology, the model of the inner rational agent remains vulnerable to
Kahneman’s (1996) critique. One is not entitled simply to assume that the mental pro-
cesses of System 2 can generate preferences and modes of strategic reasoning that are
consistent with conventional decision and game theory. Indeed, that assumption does
not ﬁt easily with the logic of dual process theory. One of the fundamental insights of
that theory is that the automatic processing mechanisms of System 1 are evolutionarily
older than the conscious mechanisms of System 2. Thus, except in so far as its original
features have atrophied, we should expect System 1 to be capable of generating reason-
ably coherent and successful actions without assistance from other processes. But if
System 2’s processes are later add-ons, there is no obvious reason to expect them to be
able to work independently of the processes to which they have been added. Kahneman
(2011, p. 24) hints at the subsidiary role of System 2 when he says that ‘[w]hen Sys-
tem 1 runs into difﬁculty, it calls on System 2 to support more detailed and speciﬁc
processing that may solve the problem of the moment’. The suggestion seems to be
that, in dealing with choice problems, System 2’s primary role is to provide decision
support services. It is not obvious that this system always needs to be capable of mak-
ing decisions in its own right, as the inner rational agent is supposed to be.






























We have suggested that there can be choice problems that lack determinate rational
solutions (with the implication that System 2 may not be able to solve them). To
explore this possibility further, we return to the case of SuperReasoner in the cafeteria.
Recall that SuperReasoner is a re-engineered version of an ordinary human being, Joe.
He differs from Joe by not being subject to reasoning imperfections: he has no limita-
tions of attention, information, cognitive ability or self-control. In all other respects,
however, he is the same as Joe. According to Sunstein and Thaler, SuperReasoner’s
choices reveal Joe’s latent preferences. Suppose that the options available at the
cafeteria include cream cake and fruit. Were Joe to go to the cafeteria, he would choose
(and would be willing to pay a small premium for) whichever of those two options
was displayed more prominently. The cafeteria director has read Nudge, and wants to
use the display that best satisﬁes Joe’s latent preferences. Thus, she needs to know
what SuperReasoner would choose. This raises the question that we asked (but did not
answer) in Section 2: Would the probability of his choosing cake be independent of the
position of cake on the counter?
One way of answering this question builds on Bacharach’s (1993, 2006) analysis of
frames. Joe’s preferences are context dependent because the problem of choosing
between food items can be framed in different ways. Or, more accurately: Joe can
represent the problem to himself in different ways. In one case, he construes the prob-
lem as a choice between (say) ‘the cake at the front of the counter’ and ‘the apple at
the back’; in another, he construes it as a choice between ‘the apple at the front’ and
‘the cake at the back’. In the ﬁrst case, he prefers ‘the cake at the front’; in the second,
he prefers ‘the apple at the front’. Joe’s preferences, as viewed by Joe himself, are not
inconsistent. They are inconsistent only as viewed by a theorist who conceptualises
‘the cake (or apple) at the front’ as the same thing as ‘the cake (or apple) at the back’.
As Bacharach (2006, p. 13) puts it, whether a decision-theoretic principle of rationality
has been violated ‘depends on how we, the theorists, “cut up the world”’. But, he goes
on: ‘For decision theory, there are no unproblematically given “same things”’. If this is
right, decision theory cannot legitimate the assumption that there is a single correct
way of framing the cafeteria problem, accessible to any agent who, like SuperReasoner,
is free of reasoning imperfections.
If SuperReasoner’s rationality is interpreted in terms of conventional decision the-
ory, as Sunstein and Thaler perhaps intend, Bacharach’s argument implies that
SuperReasoner’s preferences can be context dependent. However, that argument has
less force against Hausman’s account of reasoning. Recall that, in that account, sound
reasoning can recognise that certain factors ‘ought to be irrelevant’ for total compara-
tive evaluations. To see where this approach leads, let us stipulate that the relative posi-
tion of the food items on the counter is such a factor. So SuperReasoner cannot say
that, all things considered, the cake is more valuable than the fruit if the cake has the
more prominent display, but less valuable in the opposite case. Thus, if we accept
Hausman’s deﬁnition of ‘preference’, SuperReasoner cannot hold context-dependent
preferences between fruit and cake. But, since his feelings are the same as Joe’s, he
feels an inclination to choose the cake in the ﬁrst case and to choose the fruit in the
second. Were his Einstein-like powers of reasoning to lead him to the conclusion that
the fruit was more valuable, his Gandhi-like powers of self-control would allow him to
overcome any inclination to choose the cake. But let us suppose that, given the
premises on which his reasoning operates, the relative value of cake and fruit is
undetermined.






























If, as we have argued, latent preference is a subjective concept, this supposition
does not seem to imply any contradiction. It is true that, by virtue of his special
powers, SuperReasoner can access all the information that is relevant for the choice
between fruit and cake. For example, he knows all the respects in which eating fruit
would improve his health and all the respects in which eating cake would give him
immediate enjoyment. If the uniquely correct choice could be determined by applying
some well-deﬁned algorithm to this multi-dimensional information, SuperReasoner
would have the computational powers to solve the problem. But we know of no argu-
ment, either in behavioural economics or in the theory of rational choice, that would
justify the assumption that such an algorithm exists.
So let us maintain our supposition: SuperReasoner cannot determine whether, all
things considered, cake is more valuable than fruit or vice versa. In Hausman’s sense,
he has no (strict or weak) preference between these options. Still, he feels an inclina-
tion to choose whichever of cake or fruit is more prominently displayed. What principle
of sound reasoning would he contravene by acting on this inclination, just as Joe
would? If the answer is ‘None’, as we believe it is, then SuperReasoner’s choices, like
Joe’s, can be context dependent.
If instead we are to insist that SuperReasoner’s choices must be context indepen-
dent, we seem to need to make completeness of preferences an axiom of reasoning,
rather than a property that, depending on circumstances, reasoning may show to be true
or false. Building on Hausman’s characterisation of completeness as a boundary condi-
tion on rational choice, one might perhaps stipulate that, if an agent is to be truly
rational, his choices must always be justiﬁed by preferences. One might then claim that
rationality requires the agent to ensure that the set of preference propositions he holds
to be true is sufﬁcient to pick a nonempty set of justiﬁed choices from any nonempty
set of options. Our own view (and, apparently, Hausman’s) is that this requirement
would be unwarranted; but let us set these reservations aside.6 If SuperReasoner wanted
to comply with the requirement, he would have to ﬁll in the gaps in his otherwise
incomplete preference ordering by constructing additional preferences whose content
was not justiﬁed by reasoning.
But this conclusion is of no help to behavioural welfare economics. The problem
that needs to be solved is that of discovering Joe’s latent preference between fruit and
cake. The line of argument we are exploring leads to the conclusion that were Joe truly
rational, he would have some context-independent preference between the two options.
But that means only that the imaginary SuperReasoner would have responded to the
demands of rationality by constructing such a preference, arbitrarily if necessary. We
may have no way of discovering what that imaginary preference would be. And it is
only in the most tenuous sense that this imaginary preference is latent in Joe.
Savage’s (1954, pp. 101–103) discussion of the Allais Paradox nicely illustrates the
issues involved here. Savage reports that when he was ﬁrst presented with Allais’ two
choice problems, he expressed a preference for Gamble 1 in Situation 1 and for
Gamble 4 in Situation 2 – the response that constitutes the Paradox and that is incon-
sistent with Savage’s own expected utility axioms (one of which is an axiom of com-
pleteness). He confesses that he ‘still feel[s] an intuitive attraction to those preferences’.
However, since his analysis of expected utility is intended as a normative theory, it
would be an ‘intolerable discrepancy’ for him to maintain two preferences that together
were inconsistent with the axioms of the theory:






























In general, a person who has tentatively accepted a normative theory must conscientiously
study situations in which the theory seems to lead him astray; he must decide for each by
reﬂection – deduction will typically be of little relevance – whether to retain his initial
impression of the situation or to accept the implications of the theory for it. (p. 102)
Savage reassures himself of the validity of his axioms by re-framing the four gambles
so that their outcomes all depend on the same draw from a set of lottery tickets num-
bered 1–100. Prizes are assigned to tickets so that the prizes for Gambles 1–4, respec-
tively, in units of $100,000, are (5, 0, 5, 0) for ticket 1, (5, 25, 5, 25) for tickets 2–11
and (5, 5, 0, 0) for tickets 12–100.7 Since, in each situation, the two gambles on offer
differ only in the event that one of tickets 1–11 is drawn, Savage concludes that the
other tickets are irrelevant to the decisions that have to be made. Conditional on this
event, Gambles 1 and 3 are identical, as are Gambles 2 and 4. Thus, Savage’s original
preferences are unacceptably context dependent. Both of them cannot be right. But
which of them is wrong? Savage tells himself that, in both situations, the choice prob-
lem reduces to ‘whether I would sell an outright gift of $500,000 for a 10-to-1 chance
to win $2,500,000’. Consulting his ‘purely personal taste’, he ﬁnds that he prefers the
former. He then accepts the implication that he prefers Gamble 3 to Gamble 4, saying:
‘It seems to me that in reversing my preferences between Gambles 3 and 4 I have cor-
rected an error’.
Notice that Savage has invoked a third situation (let us call it ‘Situation 3’) in
which he has to choose either $500,000 with probability 1 (‘Gamble 5’) or $2,500,000
with probability 10/11 and nothing with probability 1/11 (‘Gamble 6’). According to
his axioms, his ranking of Gamble 3 relative to Gamble 4 (and, equivalently, his rank-
ing of Gamble 1 relative to Gamble 2) should be the same as his ranking of Gamble 5
relative to Gamble 6. He ﬁnds an inclination to prefer Gamble 5 to Gamble 6. So far,
this is not a resolution of the original problem; it is merely an expansion of the set of
inconsistent preferences. However, it seems that Savage feels more conﬁdent about his
inclinations in Situation 3 than in the other two situations, and so decides to use those
inclinations as his arbiter. There is nothing wrong with that: as Savage says, this is a
matter of reﬂection, not deduction. But there seems no reason to suppose that this par-
ticular sequence of reﬂections leads to the uniquely correct resolution of the original
inconsistency (if inconsistency it is). At most, this story tells us that if someone gen-
uinely accepted the expected utility axioms as requirements of rationality and was not
cognitively constrained, he would be able to settle on some preferences, consistent with
those axioms, which he was willing to live with (but which might still be contrary to
his actual inclinations). That is not particularly helpful if we are trying to identify the
actual latent preferences of an ordinary Joe whose choices and inclinations have the
Allais Paradox pattern.
6. Puriﬁcation – or regularisation?
We have argued that latent preference is not a useful concept for normative economics.
How then (a sceptical reader might ask) can we explain the fact that so many
behavioural economists have wanted to use it? We suggest that this practice may be a
by-product of a modelling strategy that is common in behavioural economics. When
used in the development of descriptive theories, this strategy has signiﬁcant method-
ological virtues, but it is liable to lead one astray in normative work.
This strategy, which we will call behavioural optimisation, uses conventional
rational choice theory as a template and models the individual as maximising a






























behavioural utility function that retains many of the properties of the utility functions
used in neoclassical economics and game theory. Psychological factors that are
neglected in conventional theory are modelled by allowing behavioural utility to
depend on additional variables. Often, the standard utility function is represented as a
special case of the behavioural function. Failing that, the two functions can usually be
thought of as distinct special cases of a more general utility function.
If the objective is to develop a parsimonious descriptive theory that generates suc-
cessful predictions about economic behaviour, this strategy has obvious practical merits.
If one accepts (as many behavioural economists do) that the predictions of conventional
economic theories are often good ﬁrst approximations to the truth, it may be more pro-
ductive to look for incremental improvements to those theories than to start again from
scratch and to re-invent wheels. Even if one is sceptical about the predictive success of
conventional theory, it remains true that economists have developed a large body of
abstract theoretical results that hold for maximising behaviour in general, and which
can be reused in behavioural utility models. Using behavioural utility functions also
makes it easier to identify and test the novel implications of behavioural theories and
to measure the increase in explanatory power that can be attributed to the inclusion of
additional variables. Exactly these arguments are used by Rabin (2013) to defend the
behavioural optimisation strategy. Similarly, Hausman (2012, pp. 114–115) favours the
strategy of modelling psychological factors such as framing through their effects on
preferences on the grounds that ‘if economists and decision theorists continue to regard
preferences as determinative [of choices], then they can still employ consequentialist
and game-theoretic models and the mathematical tools that permit predictions to be
derived from them’.8
Notice that for the behavioural optimisation strategy to have these merits, it is not
necessary that the standard theory is a representation of rational choice; what matters
is that it makes at least moderately accurate predictions across a wide domain. How-
ever, because the standard theory is usually interpreted in terms of rationality, it is
tempting to think that this modelling strategy allows one to isolate the effects of mis-
takes (i.e. those effects on utility that occur because ‘behavioural’ variables do not take
the values that correspond with the standard theory), and so to identify latent prefer-
ences (i.e. the preferences that would result if behavioural variables took their standard
values). Rabin (2013, p. 529) presents this feature of behavioural utility models as an
important merit, on the grounds that it allows us to ‘capture many errors in terms of
systematic mistakes in the proximate value function … or where the beliefs imported
into their maximizations are systematically distorted’. The use of behavioural optimisa-
tion models to purify preferences was discussed in Section 2, where it was exempliﬁed
by the work of Bleichrodt et al. (‘BPW’, 2001), Kőszegi and Rabin (2007, 2008) and
Bordalo et al. (2013).
We will argue that this method of deﬁning and identifying latent preferences is
unsatisfactory. We will develop this argument by considering how BPW’s puriﬁcation
methodology might be applied to Savage’s version of the Allais Paradox.
Recall that BPW use cumulative prospect theory as the descriptive model of
choice. Viewed in the perspective of that theory, Allais’ four gambles can be differ-
entiated in terms of two characteristics – the probability of winning at least $500,000
and the probability of winning $2,500,000. In terms of the second characteristic,
Situations 1 and 2 are equivalent to one another. (In each situation, the probability of
winning $2,500,000 is either zero or .10, depending on whether the ﬁrst or the second
gamble is chosen.) So an explanation of the Allais Paradox must work through the






























ﬁrst characteristic. The probability of winning at least $500,000 is 1.00 in Gamble 1,
.99 in Gamble 2, .11 in Gamble 3 and .10 in Gamble 4. The difference between the
two relevant probabilities (1.00 and .99 in Situation 1, .11 and .10 in Situation 2) is
the same in both situations, which is another way of explaining why the Paradox con-
travenes expected utility theory. However, cumulative prospect theory transforms each
objective probability p into a subjective decision weight w(p). The Allais Paradox is
possible if w(1.00) – w(.99) is sufﬁciently greater than w(.11) – w(.10). That inequal-
ity is consistent with most empirical estimates of the probability weighting function,
and also with intuition: the difference between the certainty of a very large prize and
a 99% chance of it feels more signiﬁcant than the difference between an 11% chance
and a 10% chance. So it is plausible to suppose that cumulative prospect theory is
picking up a psychological mechanism that contributes in some way to the Allais
Paradox.
BPW’s puriﬁcation methodology treats the non-linearity of the probability weight-
ing function as a reasoning error that needs to be corrected if we are to identify latent
preferences. But where is the error? Of course, there would have been an error if the
decision-maker had known the utility to him of the three possible outcomes, and if,
believing expected utility theory to be the right normative model, he had tried to calcu-
late the expected utility of each of the four gambles and if in doing so he had used
decision weights in the mistaken belief that they were objective probabilities. But that
is not a remotely plausible account of the reasoning that leads real people to choose
Gambles 1 and 4. To point to just one problem with this account, remember that when
people respond to Allais’ problems, they are told all the relevant objective probabilities.
If you were to ask a respondent what he believed to be the percentage probability of
an outcome that he had just been told had a probability of 1%, what answer would you
expect to get?
What BRW’s puriﬁcation methodology reveals is that, relative to the benchmark of
expected utility theory, the person who has made the Allais Paradox choices has
behaved as if he held false beliefs about the probabilities of the relevant events. If
expected utility theory could be interpreted as a ﬁrst approximation to a true description
of how people actually reason, it might be plausible to move from that as–if proposi-
tion to the conjecture that the person’s actual reasoning followed the logic of expected
utility reasoning but with false beliefs. But the truth is surely that expected utility the-
ory provides a ﬁrst approximation to the choices that people actually make, not to the
reasoning by which they arrive at those choices.
It is not surprising that expected utility theory has this approximation property, at
least when applied to lotteries with monetary outcomes and explicit objective probabili-
ties. Whatever mental processes people use in decision-making about such lotteries,
one would expect larger money prizes to be perceived more favourably than smaller
ones, other things being equal. Similarly, for any given money amount x, one would
expect larger probabilities of winning at least x to be perceived more favourably than
smaller probabilities. By generalising these two intuitions and by organising them in a
simple and tractable functional form, expected utility theory picks up some of the main
patterns in the decisions that are generated by actual human reasoning. In the case of
the Allais Paradox, however, cumulative prospect theory provides a more accurate
description of actual decisions. In the absence of a theory of how people reason, that is
just about all that can be said. One is certainly not entitled to infer that Allais Paradox
choices reveal errors of reasoning that are not committed by people whose choices are
consistent with expected utility theory.






























We conclude that BPW’s methodology does not reconstruct latent preferences. In
fairness, however, it should be acknowledged that BPW sometimes justify this
methodology in more pragmatic terms, as when they say:
We are well aware that many of the assumptions underlying our proposal are controversial,
such as the very existence of true underlying preferences. These assumptions are, however,
the best that we can think of in the current state of the art for situations where decisions
have to be taken, as good as possible, on the basis of quick and dirty data. (p. 1500)
Recall that BPW’s paradigm decision problem is that of a professional specialist who
has to make a choice on behalf of a client, given only partial information about the
client’s revealed or stated preferences. When BPW say that expected utility theory is
‘the right normative model for choice under uncertainty’ (pp. 1498–1499), they seem
to be referring to the decision problem faced by the professional. One might perhaps
argue that, if the professional shares BPW’s view of the normative status of expected
utility theory, she ought to construct her judgements about the client’s welfare, and
hence about the decisions she should make when acting on the client’s behalf, so that
these judgements are consistent with the expected utility axioms. Viewed in this way,
what seems to be required is not an inference about the hypothetical choices of the
client’s inner rational agent, but rather a way of regularising the available data about
the client’s preferences so that it is compatible with the particular model of decision-
making that the professional wants to use.
Regularisation in this sense is almost always needed when a theoretical model
comes into contact with real data. For example, consider an economic model of the
spatial distribution of unemployment. Suppose that, in this model, every job seeker and
every job offer have a spatial location. In the world of the model, this makes perfectly
good sense: each job seeker has a ‘home’ and each job has a ‘workplace’. But if we
try to apply the model in practice, we will ﬁnd that ‘home’ and ‘workplace’ can be
ambiguous concepts. Some people have two or more home addresses, while some have
none; and analogously for jobs. In order to regularise the data so that they ﬁt the mod-
el’s categorisation scheme, some more or less arbitrary classiﬁcations will need to be
made. But one would surely not claim that these classiﬁcations correspond with latent
truths about the world that real job seekers and real employers have failed to recognise.
In the same way, a medical decision-maker might reasonably use BPW’s methodology
to construct a tractable model of the client’s preferences, regularised so as to be consis-
tent with expected utility theory, without claiming that the preferences in the model
were latent in the client. The arguments we have developed in this paper would not be
objections to a version of behavioural welfare economics that claimed only to regu-
larise revealed preferences that were inconsistent with conventional theory, without
interpreting this process as the identiﬁcation and correction of errors, or as a way of
helping individuals to make better choices. But that is not the version of behavioural
welfare economics that is to be found in the literature.
7. Conclusion
In arguing for libertarian paternalism, Sunstein and Thaler (TS, p. 6) criticise conven-
tional economists for assuming that ordinary human beings are ‘Econs’ – an imaginary
species which ‘thinks and chooses unfailingly well’. Sunstein and Thaler claim that
their own approach to behavioural welfare economics – an approach that is becoming
part of the mainstream of behavioural economics and whose core features are endorsed






























by Hausman (2012) – breaks away from this mistaken assumption and models human
psychology as it really is. We have argued that this claim is misleading. It would be
closer to the truth to say that behavioural welfare economics models human beings as
faulty Econs. Its implicit model of human decision-making is that of a neoclassically
rational inner agent, trapped inside and constrained by an outer psychological shell.
Normative analysis is understood as an attempt to reconstruct and respect the prefer-
ences of the imagined inner Econ.
We maintain that if behavioural and normative economics are to be satisfactorily
reconciled, the ﬁrst essential is that economists learn to live with the facts of human
psychology. We need a normative economics that does not presuppose a kind of
rational human agency for which there is no known psychological foundation. One
possible line of advance is to ﬁnd a normative criterion that respects individuals’
choices without referring to the preferences – consistent or inconsistent – that lie
behind them. Sugden’s (2004) ‘opportunity criterion’ is an example of this strategy.
Such a criterion may seem unappealing if one presupposes that normative economics is
addressed to a benevolent social planner, but this addressee is no more than a theoreti-
cal or literary construct. If one thinks of individual citizens as principals and public
decision-makers as their agents, it may seem more natural to treat citizens as the
addressees of normative economics. Citizens who recognise that their choices are some-
times context dependent might still want their agents to respect those choices (Sugden,
2013).
To readers who would prefer to conserve more of the framework of conventional
welfare economics, we commend the ‘regularisation’ perspective that we sketched in
Section 6. Instead of claiming to reconstruct the latent neoclassical preferences of indi-
viduals whose psychology has led them into error, economists might think of them-
selves as doing their best to represent the complex reality of human judgement and
decision-making in a highly simpliﬁed but perhaps still useful normative modelling
framework. But that would require a signiﬁcant retreat from the ambition – not to say
hubris – of much of the current literature of behavioural welfare economics.
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Notes
1. TS repeatedly describe nudges as ‘helping’ the individuals at whom they are directed. Looking
only at their ﬁrst chapter, one ﬁnds this use of ‘helping’ on pp. 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 14.






























2. Contemporaneously with ST, Camerer et al. (2003) advocated ‘asymmetric paternalism’ as a
normative response to the ﬁndings of behavioural economics. There are close similarities
between the two proposals. Asymmetric paternalism is presented as a way of helping bound-
edly rational individuals to avoid ‘decision-making errors’ that ‘lead people not to behave in
their own best interests’ (pp. 1211–1212). However, Camerer et al. give even less guidance
than ST about how individuals’ interests are deﬁned or how they can be identiﬁed.
3. We take it that, in this passage, ST are using ‘preference’ in the sense that it is used in con-
ventional economic theory – that is, as a binary relation over potential objects of choice that
is consistently revealed in an individual’s decisions. In this sense, the cafeteria customer does
not have well-deﬁned (‘true’) preferences over food items. In Section 1 above, we followed
a common practice in behavioural economics using the concept of ‘true preference’ in a dif-
ferent sense – to refer to the preferences on which (it is supposed) an individual would act
in the absence of errors.
4. The term ‘latent’ is borrowed from Kahneman’s (1996) critique of Plott’s (1996) ‘discovered
preference hypothesis’. Kahneman characterises Plott’s approach as attributing latent rational-
ity to economic agents whose behaviour contravenes neoclassical theory.
5. One might also see it as a methodologically questionable attempt to conserve the neoclassical
theory of rational choice in the face of disconﬁrming evidence by re-interpreting it as apply-
ing not to real human beings, but to imaginary disembodied agents. Compare Berg and
Gigerenzer’s (2010) critique of ‘as-if behavioural economics’. See also Goldstein and
Gigerenzer’s (2002, p. 75) criticism of work in psychology that treats heuristics as ‘poor
surrogates for optimal procedures’.
6. Some readers may be tempted to think that this requirement could be justiﬁed by a ‘money
pump’ (or ‘Dutch book’) argument, but that thought would be mistaken. Invulnerability to
money pumps does not imply that choices are determined by preferences (Cubitt & Sugden,
2001). As a simple counter-example, consider an agent who acts on the decision heuristic of
never making exchanges, whatever her initial endowment and whatever options are available
to her. This heuristic implies a pattern of choice that cannot be rationalised by any (refer-
ence-independent) preference relation, but which is clearly invulnerable to money pumps.
7. The implicit claim that the original and revised versions of the problems are equivalent to
one another is open to question, but it is an implication of Savage’s axioms.
8. In saying this, Hausman is in danger of undercutting his earlier argument that, in the practice
of economics, preferences are implicitly interpreted as total subjective comparative evalua-
tions (see Section 3). If there are pragmatic reasons for behavioural economists to use prefer-
ence-based models when explaining non-rational choices, neoclassical economists might
favour preference-based models for pragmatic reasons too.
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